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Fred Halliday:  
Achievements, Ambivalences and Openings* 
Alejandro Colás (a.colas@bbk.ac.uk) and George Lawson (g.lawson@lse.ac.uk) 
August 2010 
 
Towards a provisional assessment 
The death of Fred Halliday in April 2010, at the age of 64, has deprived International 
Relations (IR) of one of its most influential figures. Halliday shaped the field, particularly in 
the UK, through powerful insights, inspiring pedagogy and a passionate commitment to his 
subject. His work was conspicuous both for its judicious assessment of complex subjects and 
its capacity to intertwine analytical, empirical and normative registers. He was a rousing 
speaker and a captivating writer – clear, lucid and free of bunkum. For all the range of his 
work over the four decades in which he published, Halliday remained consistent to a kind of 
‘empathetic internationalism’, one rooted in a ‘radical Enlightenment’ commitment to critical 
reason, rights and secularism. Halliday offered unwavering support, sometimes academically, 
at other times more directly, to those fighting oppression around the world. And he never lost 
sight of the need to stay resolutely independent of intellectual fads. Fred Halliday was more 
than an individual; his death represents the passing of an era.1  
In what follows, we look back – in order to look forward – at the most important 
dimensions of Halliday’s scholarship for an IR audience. The first section traces Halliday’s 
commitment to ‘empathetic internationalism’ through his engagement with four thinkers: 
Isaac Deutscher, Bill Warren, Maxime Rodinson and Ernest Gellner. As we argue, Halliday’s 
internationalism was keenly felt, yet took ambivalent form: at times it focused on resistance 
(via dissent, collective action and revolutionary struggle) to the coercive, exploitative 
dimensions of capitalist modernity; at other times it supported the spread of progressive ideas 
and practices (rights, legal equality, democracy) carried via capitalism and its capillaries. As 
such, this assessment of Halliday’s understanding of internationalism allows us to unpack 
some ‘creative tensions’ which underlie his scholarship. The second section looks more 
                                                 
* Our thanks to a number of people who provided comments on this piece: Margot Light, Toby 
Dodge, Luca Tardelli, Kirsten Ainley, Paul Kirby, Mick Cox, Chris Hill and the editors of 
Millennium.  
1 An appreciation of the range and depth of Halliday’s influence can be gauged by the level of 
comment which his death prompted. Of the many obituaries about him, those in The Times (by Toby 
Dodge and George Lawson), The Guardian (by Sami Zubaida) and The Economist (anonymously 
authored) are good places to start. A wide ranging set of tributes can be found at the opendemocracy 
website: http://www.opendemocracy.net/anthony-barnett/fred-halliday-1946-%E2%80%93-2010. 
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directly at Halliday’s impact on IR, concentrating on his interventions in IR theory, gender 
studies and revolutions. The exuberance, not to mention the sheer volume, of Halliday’s 
oeuvre (twenty-seven contributions to Millennium alone), precludes easy analysis. As such, 
our appraisal of his work is necessarily provisional, concentrating as much on the ways 
Halliday served to open up terrain for others as on his direct impact. Throughout the article, 
we make no pretence to capture fully, let alone provide any final reckoning of, this most 
insatiable of careers. Rather, our aim is more modest – to examine critically some of the core 
strands of Halliday’s work in order to provoke comment from those who studied under him, 
read him or heard him speak, and those who will engage further in years to come. To that 
end, we close by suggesting a number of openings which Halliday’s work prompts for 
contemporary IR audiences. 
 
Internationalisms: Deutscher, Warren, Rodinson, Gellner 
Fred Halliday was born in Dublin in 1946. Like many self-exiled Irish intellectuals before 
him, Halliday enjoyed an ambivalent relationship with the British establishment. Educated at 
a prestigious Benedictine boarding school in Yorkshire (Ampleforth College), Oxford (where 
he achieved a First in PPE), SOAS (where he did an MSc in 1968-9) and LSE (where 
Halliday did a PhD, albeit one which lasted nearly two decades), Halliday’s educational 
background was one of relative privilege. But this tells only part of the story. Growing up as 
the third son of a Quaker-Methodist father and a Catholic mother in one of the more 
dangerous parts of Ireland (Dundalk) during one its more turbulent periods (he vividly 
remembered the onset of the IRA Border Campaign in 1956), Halliday knew what it was like 
to challenge received wisdoms and cross restricted divides. The only witnesses to his parent’s 
‘mixed marriage’ were, so the story went, some local gravediggers. Thus Halliday was 
equally at home in the radical hotbed of 1960s SOAS and on the editorial board of New Left 
Review (NLR) (where he served from 1969-83) as when studying – or teaching – at the heart 
of the British educational establishment.  
After an early career spent mainly outside the academy (principally at the NLR, but 
also including spells at the Transnational Institute in Amsterdam and the Institute for Policy 
Studies in Washington), Halliday was appointed to the LSE in 1983, first as a Temporary 
Lecturer in International Relations and, in 1985, as a full Professor. By the time he was 
elected Fellow of the British Academy in 2002, Halliday was a major figure in British public 
life. He became Montague Burton Professor of International Relations in 2005 before, in his 
final years, taking up a post as ICREA Research Professor at the Institut Barcelona d’Estudis 
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Internacionals (IBEI). Unlike many contemporary academics, Halliday reached a substantial 
public audience via his many talks and media work – he was as comfortable debating on al-
Jazeera as he was in seminar rooms and lecture halls. His frequent columns for 
opendemocracy, as well as his regular contributions to the Middle East Research and 
Information Project (MERIP) and commentaries in the mainstream press, ensured that his 
work reached a wide audience.2 Indeed, Halliday was a voracious writer throughout his adult 
life, writing over twenty books and producing hundreds of journal and media articles. His 
first publication, a contribution to an edited volume on student activism at the height of the 
1968 uprisings, was written when he was twenty-two.3 As a result, by the time of his 
appointment at LSE, Halliday was already well known as a prominent public intellectual of 
the Left.4 This did not endear him much to the more conservative members of the LSE 
hierarchy. Initially the outsider amongst a group of five senior academics interviewed for the 
post, Halliday won over the committee with his breadth of knowledge, range of languages 
and overriding ebullience.5 They voted unanimously to appoint him. This did not, however, 
halt noisy discontent from certain members of the LSE faculty, one of whom denounced 
Halliday as a ‘Trotskyist PLO sympathiser’, an epithet that Halliday may not have taken 
entirely as an insult.6  
                                                 
2 Halliday’s columns for opendemocracy are collected in: The World in the 2000s: Political Journeys, 
ed. David Hayes (London: Saqi, Forthcoming). Halliday’s catholic tendencies when it came to finding 
outlets for his work did not always find favour amongst his colleagues. Indeed, he was admonished by 
Perry Anderson, his colleague at New Left Review, for ‘taking the smuggler’s road to socialism’ – the 
charge was writing for The Guardian. Halliday’s retort, as chronicled in his resignation letter from the 
NLR, was characteristically blunt, ‘the NLR takes itself far too seriously … there is an element in our 
discussions and in our themes of a self-appointed general staff without any troops at our command’. 
3 Fred Halliday, ‘Students of the World Unite’ in Student Power eds. Alexander Cockburn and Robin 
Blackburn (London: Penguin, 1969), 287-326.  
4 Key publications before Halliday’s appointment at LSE included an edited volume on the work of 
Isaac Deutscher: Russia, China and the West (Oxford: OUP, 1970); two books on the Middle East: 
Arabia Without Sultans (London: Penguin, 1974); and Iran: Dictatorship and Development (London: 
Penguin, 1978); a co-authored book (with Maxine Molyneux) on Third World revolutions: The 
Ethiopian Revolution (London: Verso, 1982); and a study of the increasing hostilities between the 
Soviet Union and the United States during the late 1970s and early 1980s: The Making of the Second 
Cold War (London: Verso, 1983).   
5 As chronicled by the reflections of Meghnad Desai and Lawrence Freedman, both of whom served 
on Halliday’s appointment committee. Their support was well rewarded. Halliday came, over time, to 
play a major intellectual and institutional role in the school. And he also loved the place: ‘LSE is 
unique in the cosmopolitanism and intelligence of its student body, the quality of its intellectual 
engagement, and the free atmosphere of its teaching and research’. Fred Halliday, ‘IR in a Post-
Hegemonic Age’, LSE Public Lecture, 20 January 2008. 
6 Next to the general level of disquiet at Halliday’s appointment, Hedley Bull’s reference to Halliday 
as a ‘communist ratbag’, made after they appeared together on a BBC radio show in the early 1980s, 
seems fairly mild.  
 
4 
In his inaugural lecture at LSE, Halliday set out with characteristic clarity what he 
understood to be the two core elements of IR as a discipline: ‘One is the question of how and 
with what concepts to analyse relations between states and across frontiers … the second is 
the question of value, of the normative’.7 To explain and evaluate international affairs, 
diagnose and prescribe change in global politics, to combine moral contestation with rigorous 
analysis (‘protest with perception’) was, for Halliday, the foremost task of academic enquiry. 
‘Tension’ and ‘contradiction’ were, for Halliday, recurrent themes in this regard, not just in 
the actual history of modern international relations, but crucially, also germane in thinking 
about how to understand, analyse and transform world politics. ‘Internationalism’ was, 
according to Halliday, pivotal in that it simultaneously captured these tensions and bridged 
the divide between the analytical and the normative, in other words between aspirations to 
change and the realities of power. Internationalism offered a means of both recognising the 
‘contradictory unity’ of ‘the international’ and marrying analytical clarity with political 
commitment. Indeed, ‘empathetic internationalism’ acted as a consistent compass for locating 
Halliday’s work. 
 Much of Halliday’s internationalism was nurtured through his life-long travels. From 
the initial teenage trip to Iran to his final years in Barcelona, Halliday remained an incessant 
globetrotter. This was, however, no mere cosmopolitanism of the frequent flyer lounge, but 
an expression of a rooted internationalism, driven by the desire to learn about the world and, 
indeed, live international relations in situ: be it marching with Dhofari guerrillas in the late 
1960s or taking an impromptu visit to the demilitarised zone separating Kuwait and Iraq in 
1991. Indeed, for the better part of the 1970s, Halliday acted as a roving correspondent for 
the New Left Review, dispatching informed, vivid and engaged reports on political crises in 
southern Arabia, Eritrea, the Caribbean, Sri Lanka and Afghanistan. Halliday also contributed 
a number of book-length studies issued from his journeys in an insurgent Third World.8  
All this formed the biographical backdrop to Halliday’s later, more self-consciously 
academic work on revolutions, internationalism, the Cold War and the Middle East. In one of 
his valedictory – or, as he labelled them, ‘transitional’ – lectures, Halliday insisted that, ‘I 
would value much more highly a job candidate, or aspirant to promotion, who could read and 
speak a foreign language, had lived and researched in other countries and cultures, who had 
sat in a village in Yemen or a favela in Brazil, or worked for a year or two in Moscow or 
                                                 
7 Fred Halliday, ‘Three Concepts of Internationalism’, International Affairs 88, no. 2 (1988): 187. 
8 Most notably: Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans; Halliday, Iran: Dictatorship and Development; 
Halliday and Molyneux, The Ethiopian Revolution. 
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Rome, than someone who had been cited in a supposedly top ranking meta-theoretical 
disciplinary journal.’9 These experiences also informed Halliday’s political commitments 
which were, for all their tensions and contradictions, underpinned by a deep personal loyalty 
to those peoples and individuals with whom he had shared comradeship and hospitality.  
Yet it is perhaps by discussing some of Halliday’s principal intellectual influences 
that we can best grasp the core elements of his ‘empathetic internationalism’. Four 
individuals – Isaac Deutscher, Bill Warren, Maxime Rodinson and Ernest Gellner – loom 
large across Halliday’s oeuvre.10 All four were, in their own way, descendants of the radical 
European Enlightenment, staunch internationalists, ‘area specialists’ of some renown and, in 
the case of the first three, militantly independent Marxists. At the risk of some stylised 
contrivance, we can associate each of these thinkers with an aspect of Halliday’s 
internationalism: from Deutscher, an emphasis on the ways in which distinct forms of 
domestic order led, in turn, to systemic international competition; from Warren, an 
understanding of capitalism as the potentially progressive carrier of European Enlightenment; 
from Rodinson, a materialist critique of culture, identity and claims to regional 
exceptionalism; and from Gellner, a commitment to rights, equality and ‘radical 
universalism’ – what Halliday was to call ‘complex solidarity’. 
 
Isaac Deutscher 
Although Halliday came of political age in the years surrounding 1968, contributing to the 
wave of radical activism which characterised the period through his work on the ultra-leftist 
newspaper Black Dwarf, it was his association with the ‘second’ New Left Review, under the 
editorial triumvirate of Perry Anderson, Robin Blackburn and Tariq Ali, which introduced 
him to the work of Isaac Deutscher. Deutscher was an exiled Polish Marxist, famous among 
                                                 
9 Fred Halliday, ‘Social Science and the Middle East: Myths, Pitfalls and Opportunities’, LSE Public 
Lecture, 7 January 2008. One of Halliday’s bête-noirs was the fictional, if disturbingly plausible, 
publication: ‘The Mid-Atlantic Journal of Inverted Abstraction’. 
10 In keeping with the man himself, Halliday’s influences were a diverse, cosmopolitan bunch. Apart 
from those detailed in this section, they included the British polymath E.H. Carr, the Hungarian 
economic historian Karl Polanyi, the French sociologist Raymond Aron, the German anti-fascist 
Willy Brandt and the man Halliday described as ‘my greatest intellectual hero’ – the Irish politician 
and academic Conor Cruise O’Brien. It is tempting to see Halliday’s influences as, to some extent at 
least, offering a mirror to his own character. Hence his description of Cruise O’Brien could just as 
easily be applied to Halliday himself: ‘restless, cantankerous, independent, polyglot, always 
courageous, or as we quaintly put it “outspoken”, often brilliantly perceptive, at times plain wrong, he 
embodied Schiller’s motto to be at once a citizen of his country and a citizen of his age’. Fred 
Halliday, ‘Legacies of Cold War’, Government and Opposition Lecture, Political Studies Association 
Annual Conference, 9 April 2009. 
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other things for his biographies of Trotsky and Stalin.11 Deutscher was adopted by many in 
the Anglophone New Left as a living link between the interwar Bolshevik generation and the 
student activists of the period, bringing a strong dose of strategic realism from the former to 
the revolutionary idealism of the latter. But it was Deutscher’s understanding of the Soviet 
bloc as a flawed, yet substantial, challenger to the capitalist West that informed Halliday’s 
understanding of the Cold War. The ‘great contest’, Deutscher argued, was an inter-systemic 
rivalry between two irreconcilable socio-economic systems (communism and capitalism), not 
merely the product of ideological ‘perception’ and ‘misperception’ or the latest round of 
inevitable Great Power clashes.12 Rather, the Cold War was the geopolitical expression of 
rival means of organising polities, economics and societies – the internationalisation of 
European civil wars after World War II. Deutscher saw the USSR as the geopolitical inheritor 
of the Bolshevik revolution and insisted that socio-political and ideological transformations 
within that state were having a significant impact on international affairs more broadly. 
Halliday adopted three of Deutscher’s propositions when developing his own 
interpretation of the Cold War: that the USSR was a revolutionary state when it came to 
international relations; that radical change within states significantly shaped their external 
relations; and that the Cold War was an inter-systemic rather than inter-state conflict, pitting 
into battle two rival visions of modernity. Deutscher’s impact is perhaps most pronounced in 
Halliday’s Making of the Second Cold War, in which the intensification of US-Soviet 
antagonism during the late 1970s and early 1980s are explained with reference to a fresh 
wave of Third World revolutions and counter-revolutions, and the accompanying emergence 
of the New Right in the West. This ran contrary to the prevailing views of both the western 
Left and the international peace movement, who tended to identify the Cold War as an 
‘imaginary war’ defined by the convergence of militarised bureaucracies and oligarchic 
power-elites within both blocs. Where thinkers such as E.P. Thompson and C. Wright Mills 
saw the homologous nature of each side’s ‘military-industrial complex’ as tending towards 
‘exterminism’, for Halliday, the Cold War did not endure, nor was it dangerous, because of 
internal bureaucratic logics shared by both capitals.13 Rather, the Cold War was a conflict 
                                                 
11 On this, see Deutscher’s: The Prophet Armed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1954); The 
Prophet Unarmed (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959); The Prophet Outcast (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1963); and Stalin: A Political Biography (London: Pelican, 1970). 
12 Isaac Deutscher, The Great Contest (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1960). 
13 This debate is best captured in: E.P. Thompson ed., Exterminism and the Cold War (London: Verso, 
1982). Also see: C. Wright Mills, The Causes of World War Three (New York: Simon and Schuster, 
1958); Mary Kaldor, The Disintegrating West (London: Allen Lane, 1978); and Mary Kaldor, The 
Imaginary War (London: Basil Blackwell, 1990). 
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rooted in radically different socio-economic systems and value orientations. As such, it could 
not end through arms races, Third World Revolutions or peace movements, but only through 
the decisive victory of one side over the other. Crucially, for Halliday, this was not a victory 
which the Soviet Union could win – from the late 1970s on, Halliday charted the unequal 
nature of the great contest, monitoring US superiority across a range of military, political and 
economic indicators.14  
 
Bill Warren 
Halliday’s ‘externalist’ approach to the Cold War was part of a broader theoretical orientation 
which saw the modern international system as containing two core dynamics: on the one 
hand, a universalising tendency towards cooperation and interdependence; and on the other, 
sharp geopolitical fragmentation and deep socio-economic inequality. The Cold War was, for 
Halliday, a prime example of this ‘contradictory unity’, cutting across both ‘horizontal’ inter-
state relations and ‘vertical’ socio-economic antagonisms. These two dynamics – 
contradictions inherent to the system – were, for Halliday, made starker by the uneven spread 
of capitalist modernity. That capitalism was, for Halliday, the primary force underlying 
modern international relations seems hardly controversial, at least not outside the 
conservative world of mainstream IR. But it does beg some knotty questions about exactly 
how capitalism shaped international processes. Here, Halliday was less sanguine. Earlier 
studies, such as his Arabia Without Sultans, set the tone for much of his work via a lapidary 
endorsement of what he called ‘the law’ of uneven and combined development:  
 
[c]apitalism unifies the world into a single market and into a system of political 
dominations; yet the different sub-sections of this world system remain distinct. In 
many cases, the differences between them are accentuated by incorporation into a 
single system. It is because of this unevenness that the weakest links in the 
capitalist system as a whole may be found not in the most developed countries but 
in those countries where the retarded impact of capitalism creates contradictions 
that are all the sharper because these developments carried through elsewhere have 
not yet been completed.15 
 
                                                 
14 If the ultimate failure of the Soviet experiment was not in question, the timing of its collapse was 
less certain. In that sense, Halliday was surprised, if sympathetic, to attempts at saving the system 
initiated by the new generation of Soviet leaders who came to power in the mid-1980s, chief amongst 
them Mikhail Gorbachev. Indeed, he offered a platform at LSE to a number of Gorbachev’s 
reformers, including Abel Aganbegyan and Tatyana Zaslavskaya. For a broader assessment of the 
post-Soviet legacy, see: Fred Halliday, ‘Third World Socialism: 1989 and After’ in The Global 1989, 
eds. George Lawson, Chris Armbruster and Michael Cox (Cambridge: CUP, 2010).  
15 Halliday, Arabia Without Sultans, 17. 
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Yet such emphases on the contradictions and inequalities fostered by the uneven 
spread of capitalism, with all the prospects for violent conflict that its ‘retarded impact’ 
generated, sat uneasily with Halliday’s defence of the, at least partially, progressive nature of 
this spread. In this regard, Halliday was much influenced by the work of Bill Warren, who 
taught him at SOAS and who had undertaken a systematic critique of ‘dependency’ theory, 
the theoretical toolkit of choice for those on the Left during the 1960s and 1970s.16 Warren 
argued that, misguided by Lenin’s pamphlet on imperialism and hoodwinked by Third World 
nationalism, leftist denunciations of ‘underdevelopment’ contradicted both the record of 
progressive socio-economic change introduced by capitalism and Marx’s own cautious 
celebration of this process, even when this took colonial form. Against the claims made by 
dependency theorists, Warren saw Third World development as possible under conditions of 
capitalism. And Halliday’s own work echoed these sentiments. Indeed, running alongside 
Halliday’s emphasis on uneven and combined development is an unmistakably Warrenite 
stress on the cosmopolitan thrust of capitalism as first developed in industrialising Europe 
and then exported to, and replicated by, Third World societies. Halliday saw a number of 
progressive elements in this process, not least the development of polities, economies and 
social orders built around principles of rights, equality and the rule of law. At one time, he 
argued, capitalism had been considered incapable of supporting universal suffrage, the legal 
equality of men and women, decolonisation and Third World industrialisation. Yet all of 
these processes had come to pass within, and were possibly even enabled by, an era defined 
by capitalist expansion.  
This notion of capitalism is difficult to square with Halliday’s endorsement of uneven 
and combined development. Indeed, Halliday appears to see the internationalising dimension 
of capitalism in two contrasting ways: in the first place, as linear and progressive, the 
purveyor of a ‘radical universalism’ which carries with it ‘gifts’ of suffrage, rights, legal 
equality and democracy; and in the second place, as necessarily uneven, the purveyor of 
contradictions which contained within them the seeds of violent conflict. As such, although 
Halliday consistently saw capitalism as the prime mover behind modern internationalism, he 
was less clear about how this relationship was consummated. And there is little doubt that, 
although Halliday remained an unwavering critic of capitalism’s ‘dark side’, over the course 
of his career he became more accepting of the capacity of capitalism to adapt itself around a 
                                                 
16 Bill Warren, Imperialism: Pioneer of Capitalism, ed. John Sender (London: Verso, 1980). 
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reformist agenda. As he put it in a 2006 interview, ‘I feel much happier with a copy of the 
UNDP Human Development Report than with the New Left Review’.17  
Halliday’s path from ‘revolutionary socialist’ to ‘critical liberal’ had several 
components: first, his broad acceptance of the Warrenite position that capitalism played a 
leading role in spreading progressive ideas and practices around the world; second, his 
assessment of the failures of alternatives to capitalist modernity, whether seen in the crucible 
– and disappointment – of Third World revolutions or in the remnants of ‘actually existing 
socialism’; third, an inability to support reflex anti-Americanism when he considered the 
record of that country to be finely balanced between progressive currents such as the civil 
rights and women’s movements and its disastrous overseas interventions and family planning 
policies; and finally, his impatience with the leftist tendency to valorize (or at least abide) 
reactionary regimes and movements, such as Ba’athism or political Islam, in the name of 
anti-imperialism – as Halliday was fond of saying, ‘the future of humanity does not lie in the 
back streets of Faluja’.18 Intriguingly, Halliday claimed that it was not his principles which 
had changed, but fellow travellers on the Left who had failed to learn from the events of the 
period and who had consistently taken knee-jerk ideological positions out of keeping with a 
broader critical sensibility. Although it is fair to say that Halliday’s work remained 
committed to principles of solidarity, universalism and independent judgement, his shift from 
open advocate of revolutionary socialism to a more disassociated sense of critique was one 
that many of his former comrades found difficult to accept.  
 
Maxime Rodinson 
Halliday’s recognition of capitalism as the concrete manifestation of internationalism in the 
modern era had its corollary in what we might call his methodological internationalism. Here 
the figure of the French intellectual Maxime Rodinson is, perhaps, the most significant 
interlocutor. Rodinson’s ‘materialist Orientalism’ profoundly influenced Halliday’s analysis 
of the Third World, most specifically the Greater Middle East. Rodinson himself had an 
ambiguous relationship to his specialist region. On the one hand, he unapologetically 
identified himself as a professional Orientalist and acknowledged the ‘scientific’ 
contributions of many of his fellow philologists, Islamologists and anthropologists, both past 
and present. On the other hand, Rodinson rejected ‘the Orientalist’s self-satisfied acceptance 
                                                 
17 Danny Postel, ‘Who is Responsible?: An Interview with Fred Halliday’, Salmagundi 150/151 
(2006): www.opendemocracy.net/danny-postel/who-is-responsible-interview-with-fred-halliday.    
18 Fred Halliday, ‘The Jihadism of Fools’, Dissent, Winter (2007): 144-7.  
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of their “academic ghetto”’ and advocated the application of ‘sociology, demography, 
political economy, linguistics, anthropology, ethnology or the different branches of general 
history … to study peoples and regions in a given historical period and still take into account 
the specificities of those peoples or regions at a particular moment in time.’19  
This historical-sociological method – an approach which examines the ways in which 
relatively stable practices (social structures) emerge and develop through time and across 
space – is the leitmotif of Rodinson’s work. It is a mode of inquiry which takes as its starting 
point the ways in which common social, economic and political experiences find expression 
within particular contexts. In Rodinson’s pithy formulation, ‘The Muslim world is specific, 
but it is not exceptional.’20 Thus, for Rodinson, the universal dimensions of the Prophet 
Muhammad’s message are inextricably linked to the specific features of Meccan society at 
the turn of the seventh century CE and its location within the wider geopolitics and political 
economy of Arabia and its neighbours. Similarly, the material force of Islam in the Middle 
East was, for Rodinson, relative to other sources of political, military and socio-economic 
power. As such, the Muslim faith should not be understood as an unchanging monolith but as 
a dynamic panoply of experiences within a common core of beliefs and practices.  
It is no exaggeration to say that this ‘materialist internationalism’ is axiomatic to 
Halliday’s work, particularly his writing on the Middle East.21 It was materialist in its 
emphasis on the concrete sources of religious, national or ethnic identities; it was 
internationalist in that it saw such specificity as comparable to, indeed often the product of, 
imitation and amalgamation with outside influences. For Halliday, there was no such thing as 
Islamic banking or Asian values – the former was ‘capitalist banking with a different cover’, 
while the latter was, at best, a distorting fiction: ‘there are no Asian values, only values in 
Asia’.22 For Halliday, all economies were concerned with the same things – the supply of 
money and the balance between profit and redistribution, just as all polities sought to manage 
the same tensions over legitimate authority and state power. The history of the Middle East, 
like the rest of the world, was one of resource extraction, state formation, class conflict and 
cultural fusion.23 As Halliday was to define his ‘tribe’ of Enlightenment rationality:  
                                                 
19 Maxime Rodinson, Europe and the Mystique of Islam (London: I.B. Tauris, 1987): 117. 
20 Maxime Rodinson, Islam and Capitalism (London: Allen Lane, 1974): 227 
21 See, for example: Fred Halliday, ‘The Politics of the Umma’, Mediterranean Politics 7, no. 3 
(2002): 20-41; Fred Halliday, The Middle East in International Relations (Cambridge: CUP, 2005). 
22 Fred Halliday, ‘Obiter Dicta and Other Reflections’, Unpublished Paper, 20. Halliday’s view of 
‘Asian values’ was influenced by the work of his LSE colleague, Michael Leifer. Indeed, it may be 
that this line is originally Leifer’s rather than Halliday’s. 
23 Halliday, ‘The Middle East and Social Science’. 
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This is an approach with an inbuilt presumption against treating any region or culture 
or people as particular or unique. As far as area studies in general, and the Middle 
East in particular, is concerned, I therefore start from a set of universal principles, 
analytic and normative, that would ask to what extent these can help elucidate the 
particular societies in question.24  
 
Similarly, when it came to understanding ‘Anti-Muslimism in contemporary politics’, 
Halliday sought to shift analysis away from the essentialising discourse of ‘Islamophobia’ to 
an explanation of anti-Muslim bigotry within specific socio-historical circumstances, for 
example those ‘of ethnicity, intra-communal conflict, administrative corruption and inter-
state conflict.’25 In short, ‘Islam as an object of study must be dissolved in order to be made 
concrete in the study of particular events, times and places’.26 
 In line with the tradition of critical scholarship in which Rodinson and Halliday can 
be located, such injunctions were deployed not just in analysis of these societies, but also in 
solidarity with them. Both Rodinson and Halliday championed internationalism as the 
concrete expression of their scholarly critique of nationalism. And both directed much of 
their intellectual energies towards the emancipation of Middle Eastern peoples. Indeed, 
Rodinson’s critique of essentialist understandings of nationalism and religion delivered one 
of the earliest denunciations of political Zionism and Israeli expansionism. His (and 
Deutscher’s) stance on these issues, including support for a two-state solution to the Arab-
Israeli dispute, was wholeheartedly endorsed by Halliday:  
 
Its essence was an exemplary ‘internationalism’ that recognised the rights of the 
two national groups, denounced the chauvinism and militarism of both sides, and 
(most important) rebutted in sharp, secular terms the religious rhetoric emanating 
from all quarters. Rodinson and Deutscher strongly criticised both the political 
culture and the authoritarian politics of the Arab world (something the ‘solidarity’ 
movements of today seem unable to do) and the rabbinical, militaristic culture of 
Israel. Their committed, secular stance is far removed from the totemic icons of 
‘identity’, ‘community’, ‘tradition’, and ‘feeling’ that came to flourish in 
discussion of the region. It remains of utmost relevance.27 
 
                                                 
24 Fred Halliday, Islam and the Myth of Confrontation (London: I.B. Tauris, 1996): 196. Also see: 
Stephen Howe, ‘Son of the Bani Tanwir: The Work of Fred Halliday (1946-2010)’, opendemocracy, 
posted on 13 July 2010, available at: http://www.opendemocracy.net/fred-halliday/son-of-bani-
tanwir-work-of-fred-halliday-1946-2010. 
25 Halliday, Myth of Confrontation, 193.  
26 Ibid., 2. 
27 Fred Halliday, ‘Maxime Rodinson: In Praise of a “Marginal Man”’, in Hayes ed., Political 
Journeys. 
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Like Rodinson, Halliday did not negate the agency of Middle Eastern political actors 
and social forces. For Halliday, as in other parts of the world, the peoples of the Middle East 
had, within given socio-historical constraints, mobilised, resisted and made choices about 
their political fate. Some of these had been misguided and counterproductive. Recognising 
this, and saying so without Eurocentric guilt or sectarianism complex, was for Halliday an 
elementary component of a ‘complex solidarity’ which underpinned his notion of 
internationalism. As Halliday saw it, culture was always embedded within wider networks of 
power. As such, no culture, whatever its pretence to eternal blessing, was free from critique, 
just as no peoples, under conditions of oppression, were beyond solidarity. Nationalism, for 
Halliday, was little more than an invented excuse for chauvinism. In contrast, 
internationalism served as a progressive current in world affairs. 
 
Ernest Gellner 
It is in this context that the fourth component of Halliday’s internationalism emerges, one 
linked to a programme of ‘radical universalism’: ‘[a] perspective on international relations 
that is both realistic and critical, one that advocates change on the basis of what can plausibly 
be said to be possible and which denies durability and legitimacy to that which exists at the 
moment […] it is possible to suggest three principles that can guide such a perspective: 
equality, democracy and rights’.28 Most of Halliday’s work on internationalism already 
implied such a programme. But it is fair to say that, as the contours of the post-Cold War 
world became better defined, two dimensions of this perspective, both drawn from Halliday’s 
close appreciation of the work of Ernest Gellner, became especially pronounced.  
 The first was an uncompromising defence of what, in the face of religious extremism 
and post-modern perspectivism, Gellner called ‘rationalist fundamentalism’.29  
 
Rationalist fundamentalism, whilst absolutizing no substantive conviction – no 
affirmation that this or that absolutely must be thus – does absolutize some formal, 
one might say, procedural principles of knowledge … It is a vision that desacralizes, 
disestablishes, disenchants everything substantive: no privileged facts, occasion, 
individuals, institutions or associations … All hypotheses are subject to scrutiny, all 
facts open to novel interpretations, and all facts subject to symmetrical laws which 
preclude the miraculous, the sacred occasion, the intrusion of the Other into the 
Mundane’.30  
 
                                                 
28 Fred Halliday, The World at 2000 (London: Macmillan, 2002): 144. 
29 Ernest Gellner, Postmodernism, Reason and Religion (London: Routledge, 1992). Italics in original. 
30 Ibid., 80-1. 
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Like Gellner, Halliday applied ‘rationalist fundamentalism’ consistently in his work, 
in the process rejecting variants of analytical and normative communitarianism, 
perspectivism or exceptionalism. Considering that much of his political and academic life 
had, until then, been dedicated to puncturing invocations of ‘culture’, ‘identity’ and 
‘difference’ by international agents – both hegemonic and subaltern – Halliday was especially 
exercised by the perils of a world in which Huntingtonian ‘fault-line babble’ found 
communion with various nationalist, regionalist or religious advocates of ‘cultural 
authenticity’.31 The appropriate response to such a challenge was, for Halliday, to develop 
and approach an IR enterprise which: ‘First … is empirical, conceptual and, where relevant, 
critical; Second … meets the criterion that is central to the social sciences, namely 
explanation; Third … locates issues and concepts in their appropriate historical context.’ 32 
Accompanying these commitments was a second, more concrete expression of 
‘radical universalism’, namely rights. While the demise of the Soviet bloc marked the end of 
the communist alternative to world order, the political legacy of the Age of Atlantic 
revolutions was still alive after the Cold War. In fact, its aspirations remained a powerful 
source of mobilisation: ‘a world in which the differences of wealth within and between 
peoples had been radically reduced, in which education and growth in prosperity and science 
was broadly equally available to all would be fundamentally different to today’.33 Halliday’s 
rights agenda, built around the ideas of its more social democratic exponents such as Amartya 
Sen and Martha Nussbaum, represented the kind of radical universalism that could challenge 
the status quo of our ‘flat post-ideological world’.34 Halliday championed this programme 
institutionally as the first director of LSE’s Centre for the Study of Human Rights, which he 
established alongside the committed advocacy of Stan Cohen and Margo Picken. Typically, 
Halliday’s endorsement of rights was decisive: ‘the right to independence, to decent 
government, to individual security, to education, to basic human respect and equality are as 
universal as the rising and setting of the sun’.35 For Halliday, support for human rights, which 
he dubbed (following Cohen) ‘the last grand narrative’, was unequivocal.  
For Halliday, therefore, ‘internationalism’ encompassed three core dimensions: a 
process of capitalist-driven interdependence whether understood as the uneven harbinger of 
                                                 
31 Halliday, ‘Social Science and Middle East’. Such a conviction led Halliday away from academic 
boycotts, which he saw as diametrically opposed to the core tasks of the academic endeavour: to 
listen, argue, contest and, where necessary, disagree.  
32 Ibid. 
33 Halliday, World at 2000, 147. 
34 Ibid., 142. 
35 Halliday, ‘Social Science and the Middle East’. 
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conflict or as the progressive tool of development; a principle of human universality centred 
on rights, equality and democracy; and a practice of transnational cooperation and solidarity, 
particularly when this came to opposing autocratic regimes. It brought together the 
geopolitical, methodological, analytical and normative aspects of international relations, and 
underlay the tensions between convergence and fragmentation at the heart of the modern 
international order. Halliday’s commitment to internationalism may not have been free from 
creative tensions – for example, there was a reluctance to apply to the notion of rights the 
same ideology-critique and materialist analysis he so ably deployed against identity politics. 
But his commitment, rooted in Enlightenment values of reason, universalism and secularism, 
was deeply felt. It also served as the intellectual backdrop for his disciplinary interventions. 
 
International Relations: Theory, Gender, Revolution  
As with many others before him, Halliday saw IR as occupying a marginal place in the social 
sciences: ‘International Relations is a supernumerary element, an option for students, a 
penultimate chapter for the scholar’.36 The problems associated with the subaltern place of IR 
were multiple, not least because it produced either denial (pre-1989) or exaggeration (post-
1989) of the influence of ‘the international’. Instead, Halliday made a passionate case for the 
constant ways in which international relations helped to shape historical development: 
 
The “international” is not something out there, an area of policy that occasionally 
intrudes in the form of bombs or higher oil prices, but which can conventionally be 
ignored … the requirements of inter-state competition explain much of the 
development of the modern state, while the mobilisation of domestic resources and 
internal constraints act for much of states’ success in this competition. Disciplines 
such as political science and sociology, on the one hand, and IR, on the other, are 
looking at two dimensions of the same process: without undue intrusion or denial of 
the specificity of the other, this might suggest a fruitful interrelationship.37 
 
Halliday’s theoretical interest in IR, like his work on the Middle East, was concerned with 
specifying IR’s core domain (a broader domain, he thought, than was often taken to be the 
case) and demonstrating its interrelationship with other disciplines. Indeed, when scholars 
studied the emergence of modern states, the expansion of the market, or dynamics of war and 
revolution, they were already studying the ways in which international relations interlaced 
with domestic processes: ‘there can be no purely national history of any states; equally there 
can be no theory of the economy, the state or social relations that denies the formative, not 
                                                 
36 Halliday, Rethinking IR, 2. 
37 Ibid., 20. 
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just residual or recent, impact of the international’.38 In short, the ‘myth of the bounded 
society’ was as pervasive – and as unscholarly – as that of the stork.39  
 
IR Theory 
But what specifically did IR offer the social sciences? And on what theoretical terrain was IR 
to take part in interdisciplinary conversations? On these questions, Halliday was less clear. 
On the one hand, Halliday saw IR as concerned with a range of analytic concerns (foreign 
policy, interventions, international law etc.) which it was particularly well placed to examine. 
Alongside this was a set of distinctive normative challenges (questions over the legitimate 
use of force, the rights and wrongs of intervention, ‘our’ responsibility to ‘others’, and so on). 
On the other hand, Halliday did not lay out, either theoretically or substantively, what made 
these domain areas discrete, nor how they were to serve as devices for interdisciplinary 
interactions. In some ways, no doubt, such an omission was deliberate. After all, if the world 
was messy, then disciplines could not legitimately guard their terrain like the academic 
equivalent of homeland security agents. And there is little doubt that, rather than generate a 
programmatic view of IR replete with hardcore assumptions supported by auxiliary 
hypothesis, Halliday preferred a more eclectic enterprise couched between the empiricist 
fallacy of ‘facts without theory’ and the metatheoretical inclination towards ‘abstraction 
without content’: ‘IR, like all branches of knowledge, faces two dangers – that of factual 
accounts devoid of theoretical reflections, explanatory or ethical, and that of theory 
unchecked in, or untested by, the analysis of history itself’.40 In other words, between the 
twin dangers of a ‘futile cult of facts’ and a ‘pretentious cult of abstraction’ lay fertile 
terrain.41 This terrain was occupied, for Halliday, by historical sociology.  
If historical sociology is conventionally understood as a dialogue between Marx and 
Weber, then Halliday’s thinking straddled both sides of this dialogue, at times uneasily. The 
Marxist dimension of his work took many forms. First amongst these, as noted in the 
previous section, was that Halliday saw the emergence of industrial capitalism as the core 
concern of IR, serving as the central imperative behind processes of state formation and inter-
                                                 
38 Ibid., 4. 
39 Fred Halliday, ‘For an International Sociology’, in Historical Sociology of International Relations 
ed. Stephen Hobden and John M. Hobson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005): 244-64. 
40 Halliday, Rethinking IR, ix.  
41 In his more uncharitable moments, Halliday described this ‘cult of abstraction’ as ‘Floor 7 disease’, 
referring to the 7th Floor of Clement House at LSE where the offices of Millennium are housed. More 
charitably, he associated such a position with that taken by C. Wright Mills in his, The Sociological 
Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1959). 
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state competition. Halliday also regularly used class as an analytical category, seeing the 
emergence of stratification, particularly in its transnational form, as one of IR’s principal 
areas of enquiry. As with other Marxist-inspired scholars, Halliday sought to historicize 
taken-for-granted assumptions about the world, seeing the emergence of ideas, institutions 
and associated international practices as embedded within specific historical contexts. At the 
same time, he shared a Marxist concern with the ways in which conflict in general, and wars 
and revolution in particular, had shaped the modern international order.  
Halliday’s Weberian influences were also keenly felt. First, there was his obvious 
admiration for Weberian scholars such as Raymond Aron, C. Wright Mills, Michael Mann 
and Charles Tilly, even if Halliday was not always convinced that their rich analysis of the 
domestic realm was matched by comparable attention to the international sphere.42 Second, 
there was Halliday’s endorsement of a Weberian understanding of the state as a set of 
administrative-coercive apparatuses rather than the legal-territorial unit usually employed in 
IR.43 For Halliday, the former not only offered greater conceptual clarity, it also drew 
attention away from a mistaken sense of the state as a pristine, unitary actor towards a more 
compelling toolkit concerned with how state-society complexes were forged and shaped by 
the violent intersection of international and domestic processes. The Treaty of Westphalia, 
Halliday reminded his IR audiences, was one which allowed state leaders to coerce their own 
people with relative impunity. And states more generally had arisen as administrative bodies 
which imposed order on their subjects in order to raise taxes which, in turn, were used to fund 
inter-state wars. Only much later did states become, contingently in Halliday’s view, 
representative. Rather, the history of the modern state was one of violent oppression.  
Although Halliday trailed a significant path for historical sociology in IR, it is fair to 
say that he did not offer a definitive theoretical statement of his own on the subject.44 Indeed, 
                                                 
42 See, for example, his chiding of Mills along these lines: Fred Halliday, ‘The Contradictions of C. 
Wright Mills’, Millennium 23, no. 2 (1994): 377-85; and his slightly more guarded challenges to 
Michael Mann in: Fred Halliday, ‘He’s Not Finished Yet: Achievements and Challenges in the Work 
of Michael Mann’ Millennium 34, no. 2 (2006): 509-16.  
43 Fred Halliday, ‘State and Society in International Relations: A Second Agenda’, Millennium 16, no. 
2 (1987): 215-29. 
44 Halliday supervised to completion over fifty PhD’s during his time at LSE, including many works 
of historical sociology. A selective sample includes: Justin Rosenberg, The Empire of Civil Society 
(London: Verso, 1994); Richard Saull, The State, Military Power and Social Revolution (London: 
Frank Cass, 2001); Alejandro Colás, Social Movements in World Politics (Cambridge: Polity, 2002); 
Nick Bisley, The End of the Cold War and the Causes of Soviet Collapse (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 
2004); George Lawson, Negotiated Revolutions (London: Ashgate, 2005); Maryam Panah, The 
Islamic Republic and the World (London: Pluto, 2007); and Amnon Aran, Israel’s Foreign Policy 
Towards the PLO (Brighton: Sussex Academic Press, 2009). 
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Halliday often appeared as a curiously miscellaneous theorist. He remained wedded to a 
tripartite understanding of international theory as inter-state (realist), transnational (liberal) 
and systemic (structural/Marxist) which had held sway at LSE when he joined the 
department, largely through the influence of Martin Wight.45 And he retained an admiration 
for figures like the conservative parliamentarian Edmund Burke, whom he considered to be 
one of the only figures to understand the tendency of the international realm towards 
‘homogeneity’. But despite Halliday’s tendency to dabble in theoretically diverse waters, two 
features of his approach to historical sociology were consistently applied: first, the need to 
denaturalize taken-for-granted understandings and practices of international order, whether 
this took the form of absolutist monarchy, capitalist modernity or patriarchy; and second, the 
need to study the success – and failures – of individuals and movements who had challenged 
these structures of domination. In this fundamental sense, Halliday was concerned with 
human agency – the ways in which people ‘took mastery’ of their surroundings, ‘emancipated 
themselves’ from the conditions of their servitude and, thereby, ‘determined their own 
futures’.46 For all his interest in long-run, structural processes (market expansion, state 
development, cultural hybridity), Halliday was acutely aware of the ‘cunning of history’ – the 
ways in which accident, contingency and luck played their part in historical processes. 
Indeed, he was ‘humanist’ in this most basic sense of all, seeing hope, aspiration and the 
capacity of people to imagine alternatives as the central drama of human history.   
Despite this concern with the unexpected in history, and with all due regard for the 
modesty and caution which he saw this as requiring of social scientists, Halliday saw the true 
test of a theory as its explanatory power. Indeed, he was scathing of areas of study, 
particularly post-modernism, which did not see explanation as their core motivation. 
Halliday’s distaste for post-positivist approaches, however, was not total. He shared with 
these approaches a desire to destabilise taken-for-granted assumptions, contest status-quo 
hierarchies and subvert the ‘natural’ order of things. And Halliday was as concerned as any 
post-structuralist with the fusion of power-knowledge and the disciplinary features of 
discourse and rhetoric, as apparent in his invocation for all students to learn a language 
(Halliday spoke twelve languages fluently himself), his interest in etymology (a dictionary of 
                                                 
45 Indeed, Halliday was gracious in both conversation and print about the English School – an 
approach he saw as a major improvement on neo-realism and associated positions, not least in the 
capacity of its advocates to take history, social change and international hierarchy seriously. Indeed, 
in the speech given at his farewell dinner in May 2008, Halliday implored his colleagues to tell their 
more methodologically-infatuated students: ‘let them read Geoffrey Stern’.  
46 Halliday, ‘For an International Sociology’. 
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the post-9/11 world was finished shortly before his death),47 and his love of jokes (which, 
like Slavoj Žižek, he took extremely seriously).48 Indeed, despite his materialist base, 
Halliday spent considerable time exploring the ways in which ideas motivated people to 
action, most notably during revolutions, or in how symbolic tropes were exploited politically. 
Hence, in his analysis of the end of the Cold War, Halliday claimed that, ‘it was the T-shirt 
and the supermarket, not the gunboat or the cheaper manufacturers, that destroyed the 
legitimacy and stability of the Soviet regime. Bruce Springsteen was the late twentieth 
century equivalent of the Opium Wars’.49 
However, Halliday’s frustration with post-modernism was deeply felt: ‘if you are 
being tortured, it makes little sense to be told that you are suffering from Western imperialist 
influence or totalitarian Enlightenment rationality and should instead appreciate the irony of 
the situation in which you find yourself. It is rather hard to deconstruct the torturer’s 
electrodes’.50 Halliday’s commitment to rationalism and explanation led him to see post-
modernism as lacking the substantive foundations by which to assess rival historical and, 
indeed, normative claims. ‘Explanation’, he argued, ‘is the only antidote to myth’.51 
Likewise, Halliday’s use of concepts such as progress, universalism and emancipation put 
him at odds with what he regarded as post-modernism’s slavish regard (or at least apoliticised 
disregard) for exclusionary beliefs and practices. In keeping with his sense of IR as a 
comprador discipline which ingested the latest fad and passed it on without adding any value 
to it, Halliday had no time for the recycled way in which post-structuralism in IR was 
imbibed. What worked as literary critique or aesthetic jape, Halliday thought, turned into 
something much more serious, and more supine, in IR. His critique of the post-modern ‘zone 
of half-truth, fabrication and petty mindedness’ was damning:52  
 
Witty incantations about alterity, dissolution and freeze-frames, and exaggerated 
claims about what has changed about the world are no substitute for a substantive 
engagement with history or a plausible concept of the alternatives for political and 
theoretical change. Rather too inebriated with its own phrases, post-modernism in 
social science runs the risk of becoming the new banality, a set of assertions as 
                                                 
47 Fred Halliday, Shocked and Awed (London: I.B. Tauris, 2010). 
48 This is not the place to detail the many ways in which Halliday used humour in order to illustrate 
serious points, but three of his favourite sayings are worth recalling: ‘history repeats itself: the first 
time as tragedy, the second time as farce, the third time as a fad in IR Theory’; ‘the ESRC is a four 
letter word’; ‘one good post-graduate seminar is worth a thousand anti-ageing creams’. 
49 Rethinking IR, 97.  
50 Halliday, ‘Obiter Dicta’, 20. 
51 Halliday, Myth of Confrontation, viii.  
52 Fred Halliday, International Relations: A Critical Introduction, Unpublished Manuscript, 108. 
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unlocated and useless as the vacuous generalisations – be they balance of power or 
progressivist teleology – that they seek to displace.53  
 
Gender  
Nowhere did Halliday’s frustrations with post-modernism boil over more readily than in 
discussions of gender. The pride Halliday showed in establishing (with Margot Light) the 
first course on ‘Women and IR’ in the world and organising the first ever conference on IR 
and gender was matched only by the frustration he felt with how the field developed 
subsequently.54 Although Halliday’s interest in gender issues was long-standing, not least 
through engagement with the work of his wife Maxine Molyneux, it took novel form during 
his time at LSE. Halliday’s basic motivation was simple – a rebellion against the idea that IR 
could be ‘neutral’ in terms of gender. In fact, his challenge to the subject was the reverse: 
‘there is no area of international relations that does not have a gendered dimension’.55 
Although Halliday did not take this challenge on in any systematic sense (and did not 
supervise any PhD’s in the area), he was quick to ‘mainstream’ gender debates in research 
and teaching, whether this involved discussing colonial attempts at population control or the 
systematic use of rape in war. And his challenge was taken-on by many of his colleagues, 
albeit with varying degrees of commitment and, at times, resistance. Halliday also ensured 
that Cynthia Enloe’s Bananas, Beaches and Bases became one of the ‘great books’ taught on 
the core course for the MSc International Relations at LSE.56  
Halliday was also much occupied with the ‘masculinisation’ of discourse in IR. 
Indeed, he had no trouble identifying that one of the reasons for disquiet over Robert Kagan’s 
contention that ‘Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus’ was that Kagan’s 
conceit served to effeminise Europeans.57 But, in general, Halliday’s critique of the post-
modern infatuation with discourse crossed over into his work on gender. Indeed, he railed 
against the ‘sabotage’ of an ‘add epistemology and stir’ approach which demonstrated a 
‘submission to the banalities of intellectual fashion which could lead gender issues to be 
“hidden” again under a new vapidity’.58 This ‘epistemological hypochondria’, Halliday 
argued, stripped women of meaningful agency and offered no tools by which to fight gender-
                                                 
53 Fred Halliday, Review of Rob Walker, ‘Inside/Outside’, Millennium 22, no. 2 (1993): 365.  
54 Edited proceedings from the conference were later published as: Rebecca Grant and Kathleen 
Newland eds., Gender and International Relations (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1991). 
55 Halliday, Rethinking IR, chapter 7. 
56 Cynthia Enloe, Bananas, Beaches and Bases (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2001). 
57 Robert Kagan, Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order (New York: 
Atlantic, 2004).  
58 Rethinking IR, 169.  
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derived inequalities. The result, he argued, was a ‘misplaced anthropological generosity’ 
towards practises which were anathema to the international women’s movement, let alone 
goals of universal emancipation.59  
Overall, Halliday argued that the record was mixed when it came to assessing 
progress in both the academic study of gender and the substantive positions of women in 
world politics. On the latter, it was possible to chart tangible advances: the recognition and 
prosecution of gender-related violence as a war crime; gender issues linked officially to the 
preservation of international peace and security; and the integration of gender concerns into 
the work of the World Bank. Likewise, on the former, gender had become a meaningful 
concept and its associated scholarly pursuit the subject of serious books, articles, conferences 
and courses, even if many of these took place outside IR. However, Halliday also warned of a 
‘backlash’: the limited funding given to gender issues; the cultural conservatism, whether of 
the White House or the Vatican, which sought to block gender-relevant policies at 
international conferences; and the 100 million women which Amartya Sen argued were 
missing in the Third World, something Sen correlated to a dearth of educational and 
employment opportunities.60 Theoretically, Halliday warned both against post-positivist 
sectarianism, which he saw as immobilising the discussion of gendered structures of 
oppression, and attempts to neuter gender concerns via a flight to rational choice: 
 
Gender inequality, reinforced through the family, the workplace, the media, religion 
and the place of study, is a global phenomenon, universally present and 
transnationally reproduced … women remain the victims of violence, discrimination 
and oppression worldwide. That is why the study of this gendered inequality, not least 
in its international and transnational dimensions, should be a central concern of the 
contemporary social sciences.61 
 
Halliday’s interventions on gender and IR were rooted in a familiar orientation – his 
desire to uphold Enlightenment principles of rationality, critical reason and universality. As 
such, it is little surprise that he was more at home with the work of Martha Nussbaum and 
Amartya Sen than he was with post-positivist IR. There were, as ever, unanswered questions 
                                                 
59 Fred Halliday’, ‘Hidden from International Relations: Women and the International Arena’, 
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60 Fred Halliday, ‘Gender and International Relations: Progress, Backlash and Prospect’, Millennium 
27, no. 4 (1998): 833-46; Christine Sylvester, Fred Halliday, Kim Hutchings, Vivienne Jabri, Margot 
Light, Ann Tickner and Marysia Zalewski, ‘Roundtable Discussion: Reflections on the Past, Prospects 
for the Future in Gender and IR’, Millennium 37, no. 1 (2009): 153-79. See also: Amartya Sen, ‘100 
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in this engagement. First, at no point did Halliday carry out overtly gender-oriented research 
on any substantive area of IR, including revolutions – as such, he was not completely 
successful in ‘mainstreaming’ gender in his own work. Second, although Halliday’s desire to 
avoid the valorisation of marginal voices and dissident approaches for their own sake was an 
important corrective, he could have done more to engage with variations within feminist 
thought, including those originating from a non-Western context. Nevertheless, his 
reassertion of feminist principles in a time when public discourse was being ‘re-masculinised’ 
and issues of equal pay, domestic labour and asymmetrical life-chances were increasingly 
considered as passé meant that his critique retained considerable force. And the pioneering 
role which Halliday played in introducing gender concerns to IR led, over time, to the 
establishment of courses, conferences and working groups which could easily, if mistakenly, 
be taken for granted some twenty years later.  
 
Revolution 
Like Hannah Arendt, Halliday saw war and revolution as the two ‘master processes’ of the 
twentieth century. Although IR paid due attention to the former, Halliday argued, there was 
no equivalent interest in revolution: no Cromwell Professor of Revolutionary Studies; no 
Paine Institute for the Study of Revolutionary Change; indeed, very little study of revolution 
at all.62 This omission, Halliday thought, represented a significant aporia, one he hoped to fill 
with a customary sense of judicious assessment. On the one hand, Halliday sought to rescue 
revolution from the ‘complacent rejection’ of conservative theorists, particularly after 1989. 
Hence, ‘there are few things less becoming to the study of human affairs than the 
complacency of a triumphal age’.63 On the other hand, Halliday was equally determined to 
pay due heed to the ‘romanticised celebration of blood, mendacity and coercion’ offered by 
uncritical supporters of revolution.64 For Halliday, although revolutions were often heroic, 
they were also cynical. And for all their power to create novel social orders, revolutions were 
also deeply destructive.  
Halliday wrote extensively on revolution, both before and during his time at LSE, 
coming to see it as the ‘sixth great power’ of the modern era, equivalent in influence to the 
pentarchy which Marx saw as dominating international relations during the nineteenth 
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century.65 There were two main reasons for this assessment. First, revolution offered an 
alternative periodisation of the modern international order, recalibrating the sixteenth century 
as a time of political and ideological struggle unleashed by the European Reformations, re-
establishing the central optic of the seventeenth century around the upheavals which followed 
the Dutch Revolt and the English Revolution, re-centring the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries around the Atlantic Revolutions of France, America and Haiti, and understanding 
the ‘short twentieth century’ as one in which the primary logic was the challenge – and 
collapse – of the Bolshevik Revolution and its Third World inheritors.  
 Second, revolutions offered a ‘dual challenge’ to International Relations. On the one 
hand, revolutions offered a tangible commitment to an alternative international order. 
Whether seen in the world revolutionary map of Jean-Baptiste (Anacharsis) Cloots in the 
1790s, Lenin’s desire to see a weltklasse, weltpartei, weltrevolution (global class, global 
party, global revolution) or Cuba’s support for insurrections in many parts of the Third 
World, revolutions provided a systemic challenge to the existing order. This challenge came 
from military pressure and the formation of new alliances, the development of alternative 
trading patterns and modes of development, and through the force of example. Although 
revolutions did not succeed in exporting their model and reforging the world in their own 
image, their challenge was multiple in form and systemic in scope. However, Halliday was 
aware that the relationship between revolutions and the international sphere was not singular. 
Rather, in order to function in the international realm, revolutionary states had to trade, 
establish diplomatic relations and make strategic choices, choices which often accommodated 
rival powers. If this was some way short of domestication or ‘socialisation’, nevertheless 
revolutionary regimes were caught in an unequal struggle with international forces, one they 
could not win.66 Indeed, the often tenuous nature of revolutionary regimes, besieged from 
without and within by counter-revolutionary forces, meant that they took claims to domestic 
sovereignty and state security extremely seriously. As such, they often served to strengthen 
the very states-system which they sought to undermine.  
Halliday did not see revolution merely as an important topic for IR – he also thought 
that IR had much to offer sociological and historical accounts of revolution. First, 
international factors (defeat in war, rapid economic change, shifting alliance structures) often 
precipitated and prompted revolutionary crisis. Second, international actors played a major 
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role in encouraging revolutions via arms, aid and demonstration effect. Finally, revolutionary 
foreign policies attempted to export their revolution, albeit with mixed success. As such, IR 
scholarship aided the general study of revolution by making apparent the modular features of 
revolution: the ‘period of grace’ offered to revolutionary regimes as foreign powers assessed 
its challenge; ‘active confrontation’ as this challenge was met by counter-revolution; and 
finally, long-term ‘accommodation’ as both sides of the conflict took part in symbiotic, if 
unequal, exchanges. The history of international relations also demonstrated that, for all the 
‘voluntarist delusions’ of revolutionaries from Trotsky to Guevara, the particular context in 
which revolutions emerged meant that emulation was, at best, a remote possibility.67  
If Halliday’s work on revolution produced a research agenda brimming with vitality, 
it also left behind a number of loose ends. First, in keeping with his desire to interlace 
normative and analytical registers, Halliday was keen to stimulate discussion of the ethical 
dimensions of revolutions. Criticising the lack of a tradition of ‘ius ad revolutionem’ or ‘ius 
in revolutione’ which could match debates around ‘just war’, Halliday argued that such 
discussion was crucial lest revolutionary excesses be excused by those (advocates and 
theorists) who saw revolution as inevitable.68 This agenda remains to be filled in. Second, 
Halliday rejected the possibility of generating a theory of revolutionary change – rather, he 
had a tendency to move from abstract levels of analysis (for example, the dictum (following 
Lenin) that revolutions took place when ‘rulers could not go on ruling and the ruled could no 
longer go on being ruled’) to detailed analysis of individual cases.69 Some of this analysis 
was brilliant. But it was also frustrating in its failure to construct a schema, however 
proximate, by which to study revolutions outside their specific instantiations.70 Finally, as 
with his political orientation more generally, it is fair to say that Halliday’s views on 
revolutions mellowed over the course of his career: from enthusiastic celebration of 
emancipatory struggles in the 1960s and 1970s to a more sober acceptance of the ‘dual 
nature’ of revolutions from the 1980s on. Although convinced that the exploitation, 
oppression, inequality and waste of the contemporary world left states vulnerable to 
challenges from below, Halliday was hostile to most forms of contemporary resistance to this 
order, which he described as ‘a fungible crew of ruckus societies, windbags and conspiracy 
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theorists’.71 It is not difficult to understand Halliday’s distaste for this ‘movement of 
movements’ – he considered contemporary insurgents to be utopian without a concomitant 
sense of realism, guilty of an amnesia towards the history of revolutionary success and 
failure, and holding, at best, a fuzzy conception of revolutionary agency.72 However, it may 
be that Halliday’s dismissal came too readily. He swept together a number of disparate causes 
within his critique of contemporary revolutionary movements and there were overlaps 
between at least some of these movements and his work than he realised.  
 
Achievements, ambivalences and openings 
The themes we have discussed in this article only hint at Fred Halliday’s panoramic 
influence. We have left assessment of his work on the Middle East to other, more expert, 
witnesses. We have not engaged in any great detail with Halliday’s role as a public 
intellectual. Nor have we explored some of his more mischievous projects, such as his list of 
Cold War Assassinations, a whodunit which runs to nearly ten pages.73 Indeed, a figure like 
Halliday is impossible to capture fully – he remained a young man in a hurry throughout his 
life: insatiable, curious and uninhibited. Perhaps his greatest legacy is as an educator in the 
widest possible sense of the word, a deeply informed guide who would captivate with 
anecdotes and stories, analytical insights and historical exemplifications drawn from far-off 
places about which many around him knew little: Yemen, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Cuba, Tibet 
and more.  
It is fair to say that, for all the brio, range and scope of his work, Halliday did not 
deliver a ‘great statement’ or, indeed, write a ‘great book’. Although he attempted to reach 
North American audiences via his IR scholarship, this was, for the most part, in vain; he was 
much better known in the United States as an area studies specialist.74 Politically, too, there 
were areas where Halliday’s stance could be questioned, for example the Soviet invasion of 
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Afghanistan, the first Gulf War and the Ethiopian revolution, where his support for forceful 
state intervention was difficult to square with his commitment to solidarity with the 
oppressed. Indeed, it was not always clear how Halliday cashed-in his commitment to 
solidarity or how he adjudicated between rival claims of oppression.75 When it came to IR, 
Halliday felt that he had ‘lost’ on many areas that he cared deeply about: the study of 
revolutions remained relatively marginal to the discipline, much of IR theory continued to be 
dominated by methodological narcissists and metatheoretical scholastics, while gender 
studies became, for all his exhortations, a predominantly post-positivist enterprise. But if 
Halliday felt a sense of frustration at these ‘failures’, this did not induce resignation. Rather, 
Halliday fought time and again for his normative orientations, political commitments and 
disciplinary convictions. Indeed, he saw intellectual life as a vocation – and a fortunate one at 
that – hence the admonition to the assembled hordes at his final valedictory lecture: ‘scholars 
of the world unite! You have nothing to lose but your shame’.76 
Along with Zhou Enlai’s assessment of the French Revolution, therefore, it is ‘too 
early to tell’ what Halliday’s principal achievements are. Nevertheless, it is possible to 
provide a provisional ‘balance sheet’ (to use one of Halliday’s favourite terms) about his 
main contributions – and challenges – to IR. First, the discipline. For Halliday, IR was host to 
an especially lethal cocktail in which ignorance was matched only by arrogance: ‘the world 
of international relations is a carnival of the bluff and the philistine’.77 The nature of IR as a 
comprador discipline meant that it needed to keep its eyes and ears open to what was going 
on elsewhere: ‘you can no more work in an academic discipline by looking only at its internal 
developments than you can write the history of a nation or society, or the life of a person, by 
looking just at their internal development’.78 IR was a social science, no more and no less. 
And it was one which needed to respond to, as well as explain, big issues and processes. 
Writing soon after the end of the Cold War, Halliday listed a range of subjects which could 
constitute a ‘new agenda’ for IR: ecological issues, weapons proliferation, migration, ‘new 
security threats’ such as AIDS and drugs, terrorism (including the need to divorce it from 
Islam), and more.79 It does not stand as a bad list some twenty years on. Nor does his defence 
of a resolutely secular discipline oriented towards the critical examination of modernity’s 
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ruptures. This discipline, he hoped, would be governed less by methodological strictures than 
by a commitment to empirical engagement, explanation and critical reason. Such a view 
represents both a fertile disciplinary imagination and a potentially fruitful research agenda.   
Second, a more general lesson: the need to be open not just to other disciplines but to 
historical events. Dates played an important part in Halliday’s development as a scholar: 
1968 demonstrated the challenges and possibilities of concerted collective action against 
capitalist inequity; 1979 highlighted the challenge that militant Islam posed for the Left; 1989 
triggered a rethink of what it meant to be ‘Left’ after the passing of state socialism; while 
9/11 refocused his work on the roles that culture and identity – and their misinterpretation – 
played in contemporary international relations. Following the end of the Cold War, Halliday 
argued that it was time to confine three historical legacies to the dustbin of world history: the 
Soviet Union’s bequeathing of ethnic conflict, kleptocracy and inept authoritarianism; the 
West’s history of imperialism, market fundamentalism and arrogance; and the international 
Left’s ‘children’s crusade of demagogues and recycled bunkeristas’.80 In other words, what 
Halliday wanted to see was a ‘worldy social science’ in which scholars took seriously their 
ethical convictions, political motivations and subject orientations – mining each deeply, 
paying close attention to contestations between them and refining each, often in relation to 
important events, along the way. The last thing he wanted was anyone to say at his funeral: 
‘Comrade Haliday never wavered’. Waver in terms of learning from events Halliday may 
have done. But he never wavered in his campaign against methodological anaesthesia, 
cultural parochialism or theoretical domestication. Rather, Halliday’s lesson was simple, but 
effective: to conduct research with a critical, engaged and open mind, and to never lose sight 
of the most important skills an academic can have – curiosity, intuition and judgement.  
Third, the most general lesson of all: to take the ambivalences of modernity as the 
starting point for IR. As we have seen, Halliday took IR seriously, but not too seriously. IR 
may have had important things to contribute to social science but this was a process of mutual 
exchange rather than a one-way street. As such, IR needed to share with other social sciences 
a concern with capitalist modernity, in particular the ‘dark side’ of this process. When it came 
to globalisation, for example, Halliday favoured a research agenda oriented around people 
trafficking, the movement of arms and drugs, and transnational criminality than one geared at 
bacchanal experiments in global governance or vacuous talk of time-space compression. As 
he noted, there were many things that could neither be hurried nor done any more quickly in 
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the contemporary world: boiling an egg, falling in love or building a democratic culture. And 
because Halliday took the word progress seriously, he did not take it for granted. As he knew 
only too well, there was nothing inevitable about a world built around dynamics of coercion 
and resistance, and on historical accident as well as broader structural determinations. As 
such, contemporary international relations was less an ‘iron cage’ than a ‘rubber cage’ which 
contained some degree of ‘plastic control’ for its actors.81  
 
A truly international order, in which diversity of culture and pluralism of political 
community are inserted within a global ethical, institutional and social order, remains 
on the agenda, a project which may one day be realised. But there is little in the 
contemporary world to lead us to believe that this is, in any continent, a proximate 
possibility. There are islands of progress, but this is not sufficient: cosmopolis in one 
country is not an option.82   
 
Cosmopolis may not have been an imminent option, but it was ‘improbably possible’ rather 
than ‘probably impossible’.83 Halliday’s commitment to achieving such internationalist goals, 
despite geopolitical turbulence and cultural ‘backlash’, was one he maintained throughout his 
life. It is a struggle which retains much pertinence today. The depth of Halliday’s scholarship 
and the learned, charismatic way in which he reflected on, and took an active role in, world 
politics ensures that his influence in this long-term struggle will be greatly missed.  
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